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Two experiments (N = 136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds per-
ceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and
reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red
square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue
began to move away before red stopped, so that both brieﬂy moved
simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to deter-
mine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction
event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept
depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates
with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action.
Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control
events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These
events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly
in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the
four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation
event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal
roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds disha-
bituated signiﬁcantly more to reversal of causal reaction events
than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted
similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction
events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously
reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality
for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second
question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor
did signiﬁcant correlations emerge with our additional tasks
assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval.
Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a
view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiationchlottmann), e.ray@ucl.ac.uk (E.D. Ray), luca.surian@unitn.it (L. Surian).
 BY license. 
1 Adults could, of course, construe some form of g
real world, but neither adults nor children from 3 ye
2006).
A. Schlottmann et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 112 (2012) 208–230 209into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard
assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license. Introduction
From the ﬁrst year, infants know much about the distinctive causal structure of the physical and
social worlds. A cornerstone of this view is that 6-month-olds perceive cause and effect in what older
observers see as object A physically launching B (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Michotte, 1946/1963). Actions
in the social world, in contrast, are perceived as goal directed (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Gredebäck &
Melinder, 2010; Woodward, 1998). Such ﬁndings mirror a classic Aristotelian distinction, with work
on mechanical events focusing on efﬁcient causes and work on action perception focusing on ﬁnal
causes (Falcon, 2011). However, actions not only have goals but also often are or lead to reactions.
Thus, efﬁcient causes – prior conditions that are the primary source of a change – appear in both social
and physical domains, with action–reaction links paralleling physical cause – effect links.
By 8 months of age, infants indeed perceive efﬁcient cause and effect in events highly similar to
launching but without contact, seen by adults as social, goal-directed action and reaction (Kanizsa
& Vicario, 1968; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Schlottmann, Surian, & Ray, 2009). Our primary goal
here was to trace the emergence of this causal percept in reaction events between 4 and 6 months
of age to compare it with existing work on infant perception of launch events. Second, we explored
whether infants, like older observers, see both efﬁcient and ﬁnal causality in reaction events, that
is, whether these appear to be goal directed as well as causal.Causal perception of reaction and of launch events
Kanizsa and Vicario’s (1968) reaction event (Fig. 1) involves a simple action–reaction, approach–
avoidance sequence, a minimal version of Heider and Simmel’s (1944) classic stimulus (see Gao,
Newman, & Scholl, 2009); a two-dimensional shape moves up to another shape, which moves away
before the ﬁrst shape reaches it, both moving simultaneously for roughly half a second (0.5 s). Adults
and children from 3 years of age see the ﬁrst shape chasing the second that is trying to get away, an
impression ampliﬁed when the shape moves like an animal (Schlottmann, Allen, Linderoth, & Hesketh,
2002; Schlottmann, Ray, Mitchell, & Demetriou, 2006; Watts, Schlottmann, & Ray, 2007). In contrast, if
a 0.5-s delay is inserted between the motions, observers perceive two independent motions rather
than a reaction.1
Noncontact causality in Kanizsa and Vicario’s (1968) reaction event parallels contact causality in
Michotte’s (1946/1963) classic launch event in which observers report that one shape launches the
other (for a review, see Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). Launch and reaction events are very similar, differ-
ing for 0.5 s or less, with the second shape moving on or before contact can occur. Nevertheless, the
events belong to different ontological domains to observers from 3 years of age (Schlottmann et al.,
2002, 2006).
Infants below talking age discriminate launch from delayed events (Leslie, 1984, Experiment 3) and
from reaction events (Schlottmann et al., 2009, Experiment 3). However, discrimination studies cannot
tell us whether infants react to spatiotemporal differences between events or to differences in causal-
ity; infants might discriminate smooth, continuous contact motion in launching from discontinuous
delayed motion or from noncontact motion in reaction events without appreciating that these events
also differ in causal structure.
Leslie and Keeble’s (1987) reversal paradigm overcame this problem, establishing that infants en-
code more than spatiotemporal information. In that study, 6-month-olds were habituated to eitheroal-directed social interaction in delayed sequences as these may exist in the
ars of age do so for these minimal event sequences (Schlottmann et al., 2002,
Fig. 1. Schematic causal reaction event. Shape A moves toward Shape B, which is stationary. B begins to move before contact so
that both move simultaneously until A has reached its ﬁnal position.
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uation event played in reverse; that is, if the left object had previously moved ﬁrst toward the right,
now the right object moved ﬁrst toward the left. If infants react only to spatiotemporal differences of
habituation and test, then infants in causal and delay groups should dishabituate equally because spa-
tiotemporal variables were reversed equally in both groups. Nevertheless, infants looked longer at re-
versed causal events than at reversed delay events. An alternative view – that infants simply react
more to reversal of continuous motion than to discontinuous motion – is not plausible because 6-
to 8-month-olds react very little to reversal of continuous motion per se (Leslie, 1984). Independent
work with a different paradigm also conﬁrmed that 6-month-olds are sensitive to causal, not just spa-
tiotemporal, structure (Belanger & Desrochers, 2001; Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Oakes, 1994).
Leslie and Keeble’s (1987) reversal paradigm was then also used to establish that 8- and 10-
month-olds perceive the cause-effect structure of reaction events (Schlottmann & Surian, 1999;
Schlottmann et al., 2009). From the same age, infants may perceive causality in more complex
chase-and-escape sequences as well (Rochat, Striano, & Morgan, 2004). All in all, it is well established
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contact and noncontact events.
To clarify, noncontact causality appears only in some noncontact events. The decisive factor is
whether there is simultaneous motion at a distance, as in the causal reaction event, or merely tempo-
rally contiguous noncontact motion. The latter case indeed appears to be largely noncausal – although
the distinction is less clear-cut than with temporal contiguity, with occasional causal reports in older
observers (Schlottmann & Anderson, 1993; Schlottmann et al., 2006; Yela, 1952). This may be why
Leslie and Keeble’s (1987) focused on the clearer delayed motion control, whereas some other infant
work presented averaged data from delayed contact and contiguous noncontact controls (Oakes &
Cohen, 1990). An unpublished study (Redford & Cohen, 1996, cited in Cohen, Amsel, Redford, &
Casasola, 1998) even reported that whereas 14-month-olds reacted more to reversal of launching
events than to contiguous noncontact events, in line with the view that the latter are noncausal,
10-month-olds reacted similarly to both, so these 10-month-olds might have overgeneralized
causality to the contiguous noncontact event. However, causal perception may also have been delayed
because the study used complex Lego toys, not simple shapes. Oakes and Cohen (1990) and Cohen and
Oakes (1993) similarly found late onset of causal perception, in contrast to subsequent work from the
same laboratory differing in the substitution of simple objects for complex objects (Cohen & Amsel,
1998; Oakes, 1994). Thus, there are ambiguities in how infants and adults see contiguous noncontact
events. In noncontact events with simultaneous motion at a distance, in contrast, causal perception is
clear.
Regarding the developmental origin of infant causal perception, contact causality emerges between
4 and 6 months of age (Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Desrochers, 1999). Whereas 5-month-olds reacted only
to the spatiotemporal features of events, 4-month-olds showed an ambiguous data pattern that may
mean they mainly distinguished smooth continuous motion from discontinuous motion without de-
tailed analysis of what features achieve continuity/discontinuity. Only 6-month-olds reacted to the
causal structure of launch events.
The primary goal of our study was to collect comparable data for reaction events. Only one previous
study of noncontact causality included infants under 8 months if age (Rochat et al., 2004), but this in-
volved complex and lengthy chase-and-escape sequences with multiple changes of speed/direction,
not simple reaction events, whereas cause-and-effect reversal was signaled only by a change in color
of the two disks and not also by changes in direction. Thus, that only 8- to 10-month-olds in Rochat
et al. (2004) study perceived causality could be due to developmental improvement in object identi-
ﬁcation (Kaldy & Leslie, 2003; Surian & Caldi, 2010) rather than improvement in causal perception.
In the current study, accordingly, we assessed whether causal perception appears for very young
infants, 6 months of age (Experiment 1) or younger (Experiment 2), with simple shapes involved in
simple reaction events, as shown in Fig. 1, and with reversal signaled saliently by reversal of spatio-
temporal direction, as in Schlottmann and Surian (1999); see also Schlottmann et al. (2009) and Leslie
and Keeble (1987). This approach provides a more sensitive test of developmental changes in reaction
perception than previous work and also allows closer comparison of the developmental course of reac-
tion causality with the existing data on launch causality (Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Leslie & Keeble, 1987).
Domain-speciﬁc versus undifferentiated causal perception during infancy
Many argue that 6-month-olds’ launch perception is a perception of mechanical causality (e.g.,
Leslie, 1994; Saxe & Carey, 2006), as for older observers. A complementary interpretation of infant
reaction perception would posit a perception of psychological causality, at minimum of goal-directed
action and reaction. We refer to this view as domain-speciﬁc.2 More conservatively, however, infants
may initially have an undifferentiated ‘‘A affects B’’ percept of efﬁcient cause, one that differentiates into
perception of physical launching and psychological action-and-reaction later, after integration with other
physical/social knowledge (Schlottmann et al., 2002, 2009). Existing studies of infant causal perception,
as reviewed above, are equally compatible with both views.2 The controversial wider concept of domain-speciﬁc encapsulated processing is beyond the scope of this article, but see Scholl
and Tremoulet (2000) and Gao et al. (2009) for discussion and relevant online data from adults.
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ception for mechanical launch events was ﬁrst established. It ﬁt with other work showing infant sen-
sitivity to uniquely mechanical constraints in collisions (e.g., Kotovsky & Baillargeon, 1998; Kotovsky
& Baillargeon, 2000), and nothing at the time suggested similar sophistication in infants’ perception of
the social world. However, the more recent ﬁndings of infants perceiving causality in nonmechanical
events (e.g., Schlottmann et al., 2009) highlight similarity rather than distinctiveness of launch and
reaction causality, raising the plausibility of the undifferentiated view. Thus, to distinguish the two
options, we need evidence of some form of distinction between infant causal perception of launch
and reaction events.
Here we looked for three types of such evidence. First, we considered, as already discussed,
whether the developmental course for reaction perception is distinct from that for launch perception
in previous work (Cohen & Amsel, 1998). Second, we assessed whether causal reaction perception at
its point of emergence depends on animacy cues like some goal perception tasks (Woodward, 1998).
Third, we explored whether causal reaction perception correlates with other measures of goal-based
cognition.
Developmental paths
On the ﬁrst point, divergent developmental paths for launch and reaction causality ﬁt better with a
domain-speciﬁc view than with an undifferentiated view, whereas the reverse is true for similar
developmental paths. So far, the evidence suggests causal reaction perception by the end of the ﬁrst
year (Rochat et al., 2004; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Schlottmann et al., 2009), which also sees
improvement in social–cognitive skills, joint attention, and social interaction (Carpenter, Nagell, &
Tomasello, 1998). Causal perception of launching, in contrast, appears from 6 months of age (Belanger
& Desrochers, 2001; Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes, 1994). Thus, current results
support the domain-speciﬁc view, but as argued above, a sensitive developmental test of perceived
reaction causality has not yet been done.
Agent speciﬁcity
On the second point, restriction of causal reaction perception to apparently animate agents would
also support a domain-speciﬁc percept. Such dependence between the nature of the agent and goal
attribution occurs in the perception of simple approach action (e.g., Woodward, 1998). Similar agent
speciﬁcity in reaction causality here would contrast with launch causality, which occurs with inani-
mate shapes.
For the 8- and 10-month-olds in Schlottmann et al. (2009), causal reaction perception did not de-
pend on the nature of the agents, appearing equally with squares moving rigidly or in the nonrigid
manner of Fig. 2, modelled on Michotte’s (1946/1963) caterpillar stimulus, that appears animate to
observers from 3 years of age (Congiu, Schlottmann, & Ray, 2010; Schlottmann & Ray, 2004;
Schlottmann et al., 2002) and to 6-month-olds (Schlottmann & Ray, 2010). Despite animacy not
inﬂuencing 8- to 10-month-olds’ causal reaction perception, it is still worthwhile to reconsider this
question with younger infants here; goal perception might be restricted to typical events involving
animate agents at the point of emergence but generalized later (Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, &
Hiraki, 2005; Legerstee, 2001). From this point of view, a link between reaction perception and agent
motion might be apparent only when reaction perception ﬁrst emerges. Such a ﬁnding would be a
second strand of support for domain-speciﬁc causal perception during infancy; the undifferentiated
view, in contrast, predicts no agent dependence early on.
Correlation with social cognition
A third approach to the issue of domain speciﬁcity is to look for correlations between reaction per-
ception and tasks with established domain-speciﬁc social–cognitive interpretation. Thus, subsequent
to causal reaction perception, we also assessed infants’ goal perception and their capacity for goal-
directed action.
A correlational approach is common in work on infants’ ability to engage in social or goal-directed
action themselves (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1998) and appears with habituation tasks in the infant intel-
ligence literature (e.g., McCall & Carriger, 1993). A recent study also looked at correlations between
Fig. 2. Schematic nonrigid caterpillar motion. A square expands from the leading, right edge and then contracts from the
trailing, left edge. The resulting translation appears to be self-generated and animal-like.
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correlating different habituation tasks to study infants’ structural knowledge, so our approach is
highly tentative.
To measure goal perception, we used Woodward’s (1998) paradigm. Woodward habituated infants
to a hand reaching for one of two toys and then switched toy location. In that study, 5- and 6-month-
olds dishabituated more to reaches for the new toy in the old location than for the old toy in the new
location, suggesting that they perceived a change in goals.
Mere salience interpretations of this result are ruled out because goal attribution is selective; in-
fants do not attribute a goal if a mechanical claw replaces the hand (Woodward’s, 1998) or if it is dis-
guised by a metallic glove (Guajardo & Woodward, 2004). However, they attribute goals to inanimate
objects with animate features (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Schlottmann & Ray, 2010; Shimizu & Johnson,
2004). Infants’ goal attribution, like adults’ (Heider & Simmel, 1944), requires agency cues but not nat-
uralistic familiar agents.
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(Woodward, 1999), although this can appear to be goal directed if it pushes the toy away (Kiraly, Jova-
novic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003). It takes infants 8–12 months to see pointing to/gazing at
an object as goal directed (Johnson, Ok, & Luo, 2007; Luo, 2010; Sodian & Thoermer, 2004; Woodward,
2003;Woodward & Guajardo, 2002). Infants appreciate that goals depend on agents’ perceptual access
from 6 months of age (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Luo & Johnson, 2009) or on agents’ beliefs from 13 to
15 months of age (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Surian & Geraci, 2011).
Woodward’s (1998) task is clearly a sensitive and robust paradigm showing that infants perceive goals
widely, but only with prerequisite background understanding.
Between the two ‘‘sit still’’ habituation tasks – causal reaction perception and Woodward’s goal
perception – infants needed a break in which they could actively engage with toys/people. Willatts’
(1999) goal-directed action tasks involve such interaction, allowing us to collect further data of inter-
est without requiring much extra effort from babies. For Piaget (1936/1952), goal-directed action
emerges only from 8 months of age, stage 4 of the sensorimotor period. However, Willatts (1984a,
1984b, 1999) showed that 6-month-olds search under covers or pull supporting cloths to retrieve toys
with at least partial intention, and with full intention by 7 months of age, as characterized by contin-
uous looking at the toy, by pulling the cloth and grasping the toy without extraneous exploration, and
by differentiation of cloths with/without the toy. Accordingly, we expected intentional action in our 6-
and 7-month-olds. Correlations between causal reaction perception and Willatts’ and/or Woodward’s
tasks would be the third way in which the results could ﬁt with the domain-speciﬁc view of infant
causal reaction perception; the undifferentiated view predicts no correlation early on.
In sum, our aim here was to study the developmental emergence of causal perception of action and
reaction and its association with social cognition. Experiment 1 assessed 6-month-olds’ causal reac-
tion perception as well as goal perception and goal-directed action skills. Experiment 2 studied 4-
and 5-month-olds’ causal reaction perception only.Experiment 1
Method
Overview
All infants were ﬁrst tested on causal reaction perception, then on Willatts’ (1999) goal-directed
action tasks, and ﬁnally onWoodward’s (1998) goal perception task. Task order was dictated pragmat-
ically: Reaction perception came ﬁrst, so that fatigue would not compromise our primary results. The
other tasks were ordered to maximize chances of getting infants through all tasks (discussed above).
The session lasted roughly 1 h, with brief breaks between tasks.Participants
The ﬁnal sample for the causal reaction task consisted of 64 6-month-olds (31 girls and 33 boys)
with no known health problems, recruited by advertisement, ranging from 181 to 216 days of age
(M = 199 days). We excluded 35 further infants, 9 for fussing, parental interference, or technical prob-
lems and 26 for failure to habituate in 12 trials (15 saw causal reaction events). Of the ﬁnal 64 infants,
47 and 43 took part in the search and pull components, respectively, of Willatt’s (1999) goal-based
action task (42 in both), and 56 participated in Woodward’s (1998) goal perception task.
High exclusion rates appear frequently in infant studies. Nonhabituators were excluded here fol-
lowing best practice suggestions (Cohen, 2004; Oakes, 2010): nonhabituators might not have pro-
cessed the habituation stimulus sufﬁciently to develop a novelty preference and, instead, may still
have a familiarity preference that would compromise interpretation. In our design, infants with a
familiarity preference would be expected to show little/no recovery on reversal, nondistinct between
groups, which would wash out the predicted effects. In line with this view, nonhabituators here had
very low looking times from the beginning, 13.5 s on the ﬁrst habituation trial (in contrast toP30 s for
habituators; see Results and discussion), decreasing to 8.80 s on the 12th trial, suggesting that they
may well not have processed the habituation event in any detail.
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Movies for the causal reaction task were made with MacroMedia Director. Each movie involved a
red square and a blue square approximately 22  22 mm in size. In the left-to-right motion version,
red was initially stationary on the left and blue in the middle. Red moved toward blue, stopping
approximately 9 mm to its left. Blue began to move right either before red stopped, with approxi-
mately 420 ms simultaneous movement at a distance of 7.1 cm between centers in the causal reaction
event, or approximately 1220 ms after red stopped in the noncausal delay event. To equate sequences
with/without delay, the stationary periods at the beginning/end were adjusted, with each cycle sym-
metrical around the midpoint of the sequence. Right-to-left motion movies showed the left-to-right
event in reverse; blue moved ﬁrst from the right toward red in the middle, and then red moved. This
was the only spatiotemporal difference between the two versions. Infants saw one version on habit-
uation and the other on reversal.
One cycle took approximately 4.8 s, repeating up to 10 times, with a 750-ms interval between
cycles, during which the screen went gray. In the rigid motion condition, each square moved at a
constant rate of approximately 9.4 cm/s to cover a 113-mm distance in 1.2 s. The nonrigid condition
corresponded to Michotte’s (1963) caterpillar; the square expanded for 200 ms at approximately
18.8 cm/s to a rectangle of approximately 4.1 cm in length, with the trailing edge stationary, and then
contracted, with the leading edge stationary until the original shape was recovered. These steps were
repeated twice, separated by a 40-ms delay. Thus, rigid and nonrigid motion had the same average
translation speed and start/end positions in both causal and delay events.
Willatts’ goal-directed action tasks involved a small table, two thick black cloths, a rubber duck or a
cup, and a ball.Woodward’s goal perception task involved a blue ball with a multicolored pattern and a
stuffed multicolored bird on two wooden pedestals placed on a 48 cm (width)  36 cm (height) 
32 cm (depth) stage painted black; a screen rose from the bottom between trials. The experimenter
(E) reached for the toys through a hole in the right side. Black curtains concealed the surroundings,
hiding all but E’s arm.
Design and procedure
Causal reaction perception task. Infants were randomly assigned to one of four groups; half saw causal
reaction and half saw noncausal delay events, each with either rigid or nonrigid motion. Direction of
motion was counterbalanced within these groups.
Each infant was tested in a semidark room, sitting on the caretaker’s lap approximately 90 cm away
from a 21-inch monitor, with other equipment hidden. The caretaker had no knowledge of the pur-
pose/design of the study, was told not to interfere with the infant, and was instructed to close his
or her eyes on reversal. A camera above the monitor recorded the infant’s face, and E observed the in-
fant on video. A Macintosh G3 PowerPC controlled the stimulus display and recorded looking times.
Trials began with beeps/colored ﬂashes to attract attention to the screen. When the baby looked, E
hit a key to start the movie and record onset of looking. When the baby looked away, E hit another key.
If the baby looked away prior to the halfway point of the ﬁrst cycle, the trial was abandoned; other-
wise, it ended if the baby looked away for 2 s (consecutive) or after 10 cycles. Habituation continued
until average looking on 3 consecutive trials fell below half of the average on the ﬁrst 3 trials; the min-
imum number of trials was 6 and the maximum was 12. After habituation, the infant saw a familiar
test (the habituation movie), followed after 30 s by the novel test (the reversal movie). The break was
to ensure attention to the novel event, following Leslie and Keeble (1987). The break was used for all
groups and so cannot account for group differences in recovery.
A second observer without knowledge of the purpose/design of the study checked videos for a ran-
dom third of the babies; the correlation of looking times measured on- and ofﬂine was r = .99 for both
familiar and reversal tests. When all trials—habituation and test—were considered, correlations for the
22 babies ranged from .97 to 1.
Goal-directed action tasks. Abbreviated from Willatts (1984a, 1984b, 1999), these served as ﬁller to
give infants an active break between two habituation procedures and also provided a measure of
goal-based action. First, search behavior was assessed over 4 trials, on which a toy (duck or cup
depending on initial interest) was hidden under one of two cloths bunched up side by side on the table
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position; trials terminated if the infant failed to react within 30 s. On Trial 1 the toy was partially hid-
den, on Trials 2 and 3 it was completely hidden under Cloth A (side counterbalanced), and on Trial 4 it
was hidden under Cloth B on the other side. The search trials were followed by three pull trials: The
toy was placed on top of one of the cloths, which were stretched out side by side, so that the infant
could reach the close end and pull the toy on the far end within reach. On Trial 1 the toy was placed
on Cloth B, on Trial 2 it was placed on Cloth A, and on Trial 3 a new toy (ball) was additionally placed
on Cloth B.
Scoring was adapted fromWillatts (1999). E noted manual/visual behavior toward the cloth/toy on
a score sheet separating four components of behavior: (a) whether and which cloth was grabbed, (b)
what the infant subsequently did with it (i.e., whether the infant just held/played with it or uncovered
the toy/pulled it within reach), (c) whether the infant looked at the cloth/toy, and (d) once the toy was
uncovered/within reach, whether the infant picked it up or just touched it or showed no further inter-
est. The infant received 3 points for each component if behaviors suggested clear intention directed
toward the target such as immediately lifting/pulling close the cloth with the (novel) toy and picking
it up. Intentional behaviors not exclusively directed at the target, such as uncovering/pulling both
cloths, scored 2 points. In addition, 1 point was given where intention was ambiguous and/or directed
incorrectly such as playing with the empty cloth, touching rather than grabbing the toy, and picking
up the target but only after a different ﬁrst action. Behaviors such as just holding a cloth without
attention to the toy received no points.Goal perception task. This followed after another short break. The procedure followed Woodward
(1998) except that we used a ﬁxed trial procedure (6 trials) and only one pair of test trials to abbre-
viate the session. E always reached from the right, across the stage, for the far toy on the left, with
type/side of toy counterbalanced across infants; the new goal effect appears equally with reaches
for the close and far toy (Woodward, 1998).
The infant sat on the caretaker’s lap 50 cm from the stage. Initially, the screen lowered and, if
needed, E tapped on the apparatus to attract attention. Then E’s bare left arm and hand reached across
the front of the stage gripping the far toy. E’s hand rested at the bottom of the toy so as not to obscure
the close toy and remained stationary until the baby looked away for 2 s and the screen rose. After 6
familiarization trials, the screen lowered to reveal that the toy location had been switched. On this
switch trial, no hand appeared. Subsequently, the infant saw a new goal trial, during which E gripped
the other toy now placed across the stage, and a new location trial, during which E gripped the old toy
now placed on the close side. Test trial order was counterbalanced. A camera above the stage recorded
the baby’s looks, and a camera behind the baby recorded the stage action.
Looking time data were derived from videotape. An observer blind to hypotheses/design recorded
looking on each trial from the moment the baby ﬁrst looked at E’s moving arm until the baby looked
away at the end of the trial. A second observer rescored a third of the tapes. Reliability was r = .99 for
both test trials. When habituation and test trials were considered, correlations for 18 babies ranged
from .88 to 1. Video scoring revealed that in three cases, E inadvertently omitted/added a habituation
trial. Because the data were unexceptional—the decrease from ﬁrst to last habituation trial was similar
to that for the other infants, and looking on the test trials was similar as well—they were retained in
the sample.Results and discussion
Causal reaction perception task
Habituation
Infants seeing causal reactions (referred to as the causal group hereafter) looked for 35.35 s on the
ﬁrst habituation trial, decreasing to 9.07 s on the last habituation trial, with 116.23 s total looking over
the ﬁrst 3 and last 3 trials. Infants in the delay group looked for 32.40 s on the ﬁrst trial, decreasing to
7.64 s on the last trial, with 101.52 s summed looking time. The mean number of habituation trials did
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Group  motion style  direction analyses of variance (ANOVAs) found no signiﬁcant effects of these
factors on either ﬁrst or last trial, summed looking, or number of trials. (Three-factor independent
group ANOVAs, with df = 56 for error, are reported throughout for different dependent variables of
interest.)
As expected with habituation to criterion (Cohen, 2004), looking times recovered somewhat from
last habituation to familiar test trial, F(1,56) = 3.48, MSE = 5.35, p = .067, gp2 = .06, but the decrease
from ﬁrst habituation trial to familiar test trial remained signiﬁcant, F(1,56) = 192.40, MSE = 101.95,
p < .01, gp2 = .78. There were no effects of group, motion style, or direction on either increase, decrease,
or the familiar test trial itself, which had looking times of 10.05 s in the causal group and 8.18 s in the
delay group. All in all, infants in the causal and delay groups showed a similar pattern of attention dur-
ing habituation.Reversal test
In Fig. 3, infants in both groups showed renewed attention when direction of motion was reversed,
but infants in the causal group showed about twice as much recovery as infants in the delay group
(12.74 and 6.12 s, respectively). An ANOVA on the recovery of looking from familiar test to reversal
test, with group, motion style, and direction of movement as between-participants factors, found a
corresponding main effect of group, F(1,56) = 5.02, MSE = 139.96, p = .029, gp2 = .08. Whether the
shape moved in an apparently animate nonrigid manner had no effects, and direction also had no ef-
fects, F(1,56) < 2.44, p > .124, gp2 < .04.
The difference in recovery of looking between causal and delay groups was conﬁrmed nonparamet-
rically (Mann–Whitney U = 323.5, p = .011). When groups were analyzed separately, recovery from
familiar test to reversal test was signiﬁcant for both, F(1,28) = 29.27, MSE = 88.77, p < .01, gp2 = .51,
z = –5.13, p < .01 (Wilcoxon) for the causal group and F(1,28) = 11.70, MSE = 51.19, p < .01, gp2 = .30,
z = –3.09, p < .01 for the delay group, with no other effects. Thus, infants in both groups were sensitive
to reversal of spatiotemporal direction, but the causal group was also sensitive to the reversal in causal
structure.Fig. 3. Looking times and standard errors to familiar and reversal tests in causal reaction and noncausal delay groups with both
rigid and nonrigid motion in Experiment 1. As can be seen, 6-month-olds recover more to reversal of the causal reaction event
than to reversal of the delay event without differences depending on style of motion.
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We found good performance on these tasks, in line with previous work (Willatts, 1984a, 1984b,
1999). Infants mostly retrieved the toy, displaying partial or full intention, with mean scores of 8.57
(out of 12) in the search component and 9.77 in the pull component of this task. When performance
on both components was compared, pulling was slightly easier than searching, F(1,41) = 8.51,
MSE = 2.73, p < .01, gp2 = .17, reﬂecting its lower memory demand or a practice effect. For searching,
there was a linear decrease across trials, F(1,41) = 14.37, MSE = 12.02, p < .01, gp2 = .26, from 10.19
on the partial hiding trial, over 9.29 and 8.36 on the A trials, to 7.48 on the B trial, where many chil-
dren committed the classic AB error but then corrected themselves, as often is reported. On the pull
component, children performed equally well across trials (F < 1). Overall performance was similar
to that in previous studies (Willatts, 1984a, 1984b, 1999) without detectable fatigue in this lengthy
session.Goal perception task
Results replicated previous ﬁndings (Woodward, 1998); infants preferred to look at new goal
events even at the end of this lengthy session. As Fig. 4 shows, looking time decreased over 6 famil-
iarization trials, with some minor irregularities, from 16.26 s to 11.40 s, F(4.18,225.44 [Greenhouse–
Geisser]) = 4.55, MSE = 85.42, p < .01, gp2 = .08, and then increased to 15.10 s on the location switch
trial without movement, F(1,54) = 7.83, MSE = 54.18, p < .01, gp2 = .13. On test trials, infants clearly
looked longer when the hand reached for the new goal (17.35 s) than when it reached for the new
location (8.04 s), F(1,54) = 22.67, MSE = 212.14, p < .01, gp2 = .30.
Order of the test trials did not affect performance on the test trials (F < 1), but the group who would
see the new goal test ﬁrst showed less increase in looking from last familiarization to switched loca-
tion trial, F(1,54) = 4.42,MSE = 54.18, p = .04, gp2 = .08. This does not qualify the main result, however,
because both order groups looked longer at new goal tests than at new location tests, F(1,26) = 13.58,
MSE = 139.30, p < .01, gp2 = .34, and F(1,28) = 10.73,MSE = 279.79, p < .01, gp2 = .28. This was also con-
ﬁrmed nonparametrically in both order groups (z = –3.24 and z = –3.71, both ps < .01 [Wilcoxon],
respectively).Fig. 4. Looking times and standard errors on 9 ﬁxed trials in Woodward’s goal perception task for 56 6-month-olds in
Experiment 1. Infants look longer at new goal test trials than at new location test trials: fam, familiarization; loc, location.
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Causal reaction perception (difference between looking to familiar and reversal tests) was not sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with either goal perception (difference between looking to new goal and new
location events) (r = –.22, p > .10) or goal-directed action for search (r = .05, p > .70) and pull compo-
nents (r = –.20, p > .19). Correlations did not improve when causal and noncausal groups were consid-
ered separately. Goal perception did not correlate with goal-directed action either (r = –.12, p > .46 and
r = .14, p > .39), but goal-directed pulling and searching were correlated with each other (r = .40,
p < .01). The same pattern appeared with age in days partialled out.
In summary, this experiment established that infants perceive causation at a distance in a reaction
event by 6 months of age, earlier than reported previously. Causal reaction perception did not depend
on the event involving nonrigid animate motion. Our 6-month-olds also perceived goal-directed ac-
tion following Woodward (1998) and could engage in goal-directed action following Willatts
(1984a, 1984b, 1999), but individual differences in these tasks did not correlate with individual differ-
ences in causal reaction perception.
Experiment 2
Because 6-month-olds clearly perceived causality in action-and-reaction sequences, Experiment 2
considered 4- and 5-month-olds. These younger infants were tested only on the causal reaction task.
Method
Participants
Experiment 2 included 72 infants (35 girls and 37 boys, mean age = 157 days). Of these, 48 were 5-
month-olds (range = 151–183 days). A further 28 5-month-olds were excluded (6 for fussiness and 22
for failure to habituate in 12 trials). The other 24 infants were 4-month-olds (range = 126–151 days). A
further 27 4-month-olds were excluded (16 for fussiness and 11 for failure to habituate in 12 trials).
We had planned to test equal numbers of 4- and 5-month-olds, but it became clear that the 4-month-
olds had a much higher attrition rate. Moreover, even those who made it through the experiment be-
haved qualitatively differently from the 6-month-olds in Experiment 1 (see Results and Discussion).
Therefore, we focused on 5-month-olds, who behaved similarly to 6-month-olds.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure for the causal reaction task were as before. A second observer checked 24
videos (8 from 4-month-olds and 16 from 5-month-olds), otherwise randomly selected. Looking times
measured on- and ofﬂine had rs = .97 and .99 for familiar and reversal tests at 4 months of age, respec-
tively, and rs = 1 and .99 for familiar and reversal tests at 5 months of age, respectively. When all trials
(habituation and test) were considered, correlations for the 24 babies ranged from .97 to 1.
Results and discussion
We report two sets of analyses: one including all 72 infants, to maximize power, and one excluding
the 4-month-olds, to make sure that results did not unduly reﬂect their different approach (see
below). Results in parentheses below are for the second analysis that included only the 5-month-olds.
However, both analyses come to the same conclusion—that these very young infants, in contrast to
those in Experiment 1, did not yet perceive causality here.
Habituation
The causal and delay groups behaved similarly during habituation. Infants in the causal group looked
for 37.95 (37.83) s on the ﬁrst habituation trial, decreasing to 7.39 (7.65) s on the last habituation trial,
with 123.26 (119.54) s total looking over the ﬁrst 3 and last 3 trials. Infants in the delay group looked for
32.05 (30.75) s on theﬁrst trial, decreasing to 8.35 (8.56) s on the last trial,with104.41 (99.97) s summed
Table 1
Four-month-olds showed less systematic looking than older infants.
Experiment Number of infants Mean number of
cancelled trials
% Infants with no, few,or many cancelled
trials
0 1–3 >3
Habituators
6 months (Experiment 1) 64 1.43 56 30 14
5 months (Experiment 2) 48 2.88 46 29 25
4 months (Experiment 2) 24 5.79 21 42 38
Excluded infants
Nonhabituators
6 months (Experiment 1) 26 4.92 19 31 50
5 months (Experiment 2) 22 5.86 41 14 45
4 months (Experiment 2) 11 7.67 45 18 36
Noncompletions (etc.)
6 months (Experiment 1) 9 Total exclusion rate: 35% (35/99)
5 months (Experiment 2) 6 37% (28/76)
4 months (Experiment 2) 16 53% (27/51)
Note. The table shows thenumber of infants included/excluded in Experiments 1 and2,meannumber of cancelled trials for infants
who completed the experiment, % of infants with none, few, or many cancelled trials, and the overall exclusion rate at the 3 ages.
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trial or summed looking, whether the whole sample or only 5-month-olds were considered.
On the familiar test trial, infants in the causal and delay groups looked for 10.11 (10.50) and 11.94
(11.10) s, respectively, a signiﬁcant increase from the last habituation trial, F(1,64) = 15.37,
MSE = 44.06, p < .01, gp2 = .19 (F(1,40) = 5.38, MSE = 50.50, p = .03, gp2 = .12). Decreased looking from
ﬁrst habituation trial to familiar test trial remained signiﬁcant, F(1,64) and F(1,40) > 141. The decrease
was smaller in the delay group than in the causal group, F(1,64) = 5.54,MSE = 205.67, p = .02, gp2 = .08,
but the group difference lost signiﬁcance when 4-month-olds were eliminated, F(1,40) = 2.83,
MSE = 180.46, p = .10, gp2 = .07, and the decrease remained signiﬁcant (F > 57) and to more than crite-
rion for both groups in both analyses. A group difference also appeared in the number of habituation
trials; infants seeing delay events required more trials (7.78 vs. 6.89), F(1,64) = 4.42, MSE = 3.25,
p = .04, gp2 = .07. This effect again was due to the 4-month-olds. When they were eliminated, it disap-
peared (F < 1), with 7.57 and 7.16 trials in the delay and reaction groups, respectively.3
Also of interest is that the 4-month-olds, in line with the high attrition rate of 53%, had generally
more erratic attention (Table 1). Onemeasure of this is the number of cancelled trials, with infants look-
ing and looking away immediately and/or E unsuccessfully trying to attract infants’ attention by starting
themotion. The 4-month-olds had on average 5.79 such trials,whereas older infants had less than 3. The
4-month-olds also had farmore variability than older infants, with amean standard error of 2.46 across
all trials, whereas older infants had roughly half of this, and on the test trials the difference was even
more pronounced. For all of these reasons, we decided not to rely unduly on the 4-month-olds’ data.Reversal test
The right panel of Fig. 5 shows recovery of 8.14 s from familiar test to reversal test for infants in the
causal group and of 5.82 s for infants in the delay group when all 72 infants were considered. This
group difference was not signiﬁcant (F < 1), and there were no other signiﬁcant effects. When causal3 On the increase from last habituation test trial to familiar test trial, there was also a Motion Style  Direction interaction,
F(1,64) = 8.69, MSE = 44.06, p < .01, gp2 = .12 (F(1,40) = 7.41, MSE = 50.50, p = .01, gp2 = .16). The 5-month-olds seeing nonrigid
right–left motion and the 4-month-olds seeing rigid left–right motion increased slightly more than the other counterbalancing
groups, but this did not differ between the causal and delay groups and so does not qualify our main result. The same interaction
appeared, for the same reason, when the decrease from ﬁrst habituation test trial to the familiar test trial was considered,
F(1,64) = 3.30, MSE = 205.67, p = .07, gp2 = .05, (F(1,40) = 5.49, MSE = 180.46, p = .02, gp2 = .12). This analysis also showed a main
effect of direction, with infants looking longer at left–right motion than at right–left motion, F(1,64) = 4.01, MSE = 188.581, p = .05,
gp2 = .06 (F(1,40) = 2.65, MSE = 181.01, p = .11, gp2 = .06), which is of little interest.
Fig. 5. Looking times and standard errors to familiar and reversal tests for Experiments 1 and 2. Asterisk (⁄) indicates that
recovery differs signiﬁcantly from 0/between groups at p < .05. Although 6-month-olds and younger infants recover to reversal
of the habituation event, only 6-month-olds recover more to reversal of causal reaction event than to the noncausal delay event.
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MSE = 84.01, p < .01, gp2 = .32, and F(1,32) = 7.04, MSE = 81.63, p = .01, gp2 = .18, respectively; there
were no other effects. The result was also conﬁrmed nonparametrically. Both groups showed recovery
on reversal (z = –2.83 and z = –2.81, p < .01 [Wilcoxon], respectively), but the group difference in
recovery was nonsigniﬁcant (Mann–Whitney U = 597.0, z = –0.57, p = .57).
To make sure that the absence of a group difference was not due to the erratic 4-month-olds, we
redid the analyses using just 5-month-olds. We now found recoveries of 6.74 and 4.63 s in the causal
and noncausal groups, respectively. The recovery within each group remained signiﬁcant,
F(1,21) = 8.27, MSE = 70.59, p < .01, gp2 = .28, z = –3.03, p < .01 (Wilcoxon), and F(1,19) = 4.85,
MSE = 47.51, p = .040, gp2 = .20, z = –2.16, p = .03, respectively. The group difference remained nonsig-
niﬁcant (F < 1 and Mann–Whitney U = 249.0, z = –0.80, p = .43). This is not a matter of low power with
48 infants (compared with 64 in Experiment 1) given that the group difference remains solidly non-
signiﬁcant, F(1,88) = 1.34, even if a doubled sample size of 96 is assumed.4
In sum, infants in Experiment 2 were sensitive to the change in spatiotemporal direction like the 6-
month-olds in Experiment 1, but unlike them, these younger infants did not react differentially to
reversal of causal and noncausal events. This corresponds to the results with launch events (Cohen
& Amsel, 1998).
Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2
We also compared recovery from familiar test to reversal test across experiments in two ways.
First, we tested the 64 6-month-olds against all 72 younger infants. Second, we eliminated the erratic4 We literally duplicated our data set and reran the analysis for this simulated F value. Thus, the effect has the same size (our
results provide an unbiased estimate), but error variability is substantially reduced. For 4-month-olds analyzed separately,
recovery was 11.31 s in the causal group and 7.93 s in the delay group. This group difference was nonsigniﬁcant (F < 1). In fact, the
recovery itself was nonsigniﬁcant as well in both groups, F(1, 7) = 3.07, MSE = 149.63, p = .12, gp2 = .31, and F(1, 9) = 1.48,
MSE = 139.65, p = .26, gp2 = .14, respectively. This may reﬂect small sample size together with high error variability at this age. If
we assume a doubled sample size, the recovery would be signiﬁcant in both groups, but importantly, the crucial group difference
would still have F < 1 even with a tripled sample size of 72.
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month-olds; to avoid this, we included only the ﬁrst 48 6-month-olds. We also removed two, three,
and two outliers (box plot) from the three ages in these analyses.5
The crucial age  group interaction, reﬂecting signiﬁcantly more recovery to reaction and delay
events in 6-month-olds than in younger infants, reached F(1,77) = 4.16, MSE = 91.15, p = .045,
gp2 = .05 when 5- and 6-month-olds were compared and F(1,113) = 3.83, MSE = 106.25, p = .053,
gp2 = .03 when 6-month-olds were tested against all younger infants. The only other effects were a
group main effect, F(1,113) = 7.84, MSE = 106.25, p < .01, gp2 = .07, and F(1,77) = 5.92, MSE = 91.15,
p = .017, gp2 = .07, respectively, in both analyses, qualiﬁed by the interactions with age described
above, and an age  direction interaction, F(1,77) = 4.79, MSE = 91.15, p = .032, gp2 = .06, reﬂecting
more recovery in the right–left direction at 6 months of age but less at 5 months of age.
Despite low sensitivity, these age comparisons conﬁrm the impression from the two experiments
considered separately—that perceptual causality for action-and-reaction sequences manifests by
6 months of age, not before, just as previously reported for perceptual causality in collision sequences
(Cohen & Amsel, 1998).General discussion
The main ﬁnding was that 6-month-olds perceived causation at a distance in the reaction event,
whereas younger infants did not. Second, sensitivity to the causal structure of reaction events did
not depend on animate-like or inanimatemotion pattern. Third, causal reaction perception did not cor-
relate with goal perception or goal-directed action even though at the group level infants succeeded in
both Woodward’s (1998) goal perception task and Willatts’ (1999) goal-directed action tasks. We now
discuss how these ﬁndings ﬁt with views on the developmental emergence of causal perception and on
whether infants perceive undifferentiated causality or psychological action and reaction.Emergence of perceptual causality for reaction events
Our ﬁnding that reaction causality emerges at 6 months is an earlier age than previously found
with reaction sequences. This reﬂects our more sensitive procedure, with simpler shorter events
and more salient causal reversal than in Rochat et al. (2004).
Younger infants of 5 months reacted to spatiotemporal structurebutdidnotnote reversal of causality
over and beyond this, and it is not entirely clear that 4-month-olds even perceived the spatiotemporal
reversal. To be sure, our task was demanding at 4 months, and wemight ﬁnd signiﬁcant dishabituation
to reversal of both causal and delayed events if stimuli or samplewere larger (see footnote 4); that is, 4-
month-olds maywell be sensitive to spatiotemporal structure. This notwithstanding, there was no sign
of signiﬁcantly different response to reversal of causal and delayed events in 4-month-olds or the less
erratic 5-month-olds, and even a substantially larger sample would be unlikely to change this. The con-
clusion stands that infants younger than 6 months do not appear to perceive reaction causality.
Is it no objection that the means difference between the causal and delay groups, even if solidly
nonsigniﬁcant, were in the right direction for the younger infants. Although a skill could emerge rap-
idly, with a test producing no effect one month and a signiﬁcant effect the next month, it is perhaps
more typical that skills emerge gradually and/or that some children are precocious, so that below
threshold effects appear at transitional ages at the group level. The pattern here ﬁts with this view.65 If outliers are removed from our initial analyses as well, results do not change. In Experiment 1 the crucial group main effect
for 6-month-olds goes to F(1, 54) = 10.47, MSE = 110.70, p < .01, gp2 = .06, and in Experiment 2 it remains at F < 1 for 5-month-olds
alone and for 4- and 5-month-olds combined.
6 Most statements about age of onset in cognitive development are based on conventional signiﬁcance with conventional group
sizes (with very large groups, even small mean differences inevitably become signiﬁcant) in cross-sectional designs. Sample sizes
of 64 and 72 in Experiments 1 and 2 here, respectively, are normal to large. For comparison, Cohen and Amsel’s (1998) study had
36 infants in each experiment, and Rochat et al.’s (2004) had 51 infants in their causal group plus 14 in a noncausal control group.
Leslie and Keeble (1987) had 17 participants in each causal and control group. Thus, lack of power would not seem to be a concern
here.
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seems to parallel that reported for launch causality by Cohen and Amsel (1998), who argued that 4-
month-olds distinguish smooth continuous motion from discontinuous motion, 5-month-olds begin
to process spatiotemporal structure, but only 6-month-olds process causality (Leslie & Keeble,
1987; Oakes, 1994).
Two theoretical views exist on the emergence of this perceived causality. For Cohen and colleagues
(1998), it is gradually constructed over the ﬁrst half year, directly reﬂecting the time course found
here. For Leslie (1994), it is a modular and innate ability. This is not ruled out even by clear evidence
that infants do not perceive causality before 6 months of age because innate abilities may unfold on a
maturational schedule. The nativist position may seem vacuous, but its argument is logical: The alter-
native, experience-dependent view does not account for how infants create causal structure where
initially there was none, and the nativist account bypasses this difﬁculty with a Kantian a priori argu-
ment. Both views could be combined by assuming that experience is necessary to trigger the a priori
structure.
Both positions also need to accommodate the novel ﬁnding that infants are progressing not just
toward perception of contact causality but equally toward perception of noncontact causality. This
brings us to our second theoretical question of whether infant perception of causality is domain-
speciﬁc or undifferentiated.
Action-and-reaction or undifferentiated perception of causality?
Three sources of evidence relevant to this question were considered here, and the pattern of results
was as expected under the undifferentiated view. Under this view, infants see A causally affecting B in
an unspeciﬁed manner in reaction (and launch) events rather than A and B engaging in goal-directed
action and reaction.
Developmental course
First, simultaneous emergence of reaction and launch causality, as found by comparison of the cur-
rent and previous results, ﬁts well with the undifferentiated account, whereas a developmental lag
would be more difﬁcult to reconcile with it given similar sensitivity to both social and physical infor-
mation early on. Rochat et al.’s (2004) previous ﬁnding of reaction emerging later than launch causal-
ity favored the domain-speciﬁc account, but this result did not hold up here when reaction causality
was tested with a sensitive procedure paralleling that used to originally establish causal perception of
launching at 6 months of age (Leslie & Keeble, 1987).
Although the undifferentiated view is the more parsimonious interpretation of parallel develop-
mental paths, we cannot rule out that two distinct perceptual causalities emerge at the same age:
one tied to physical reasoning and one tied to social reasoning. This is not inherently implausible.
Simple goal-based cognition is within 6-month-olds’ grasp (Luo & Johnson, 2009; Woodward,
1998), and perceived reaction causality involves only attributions of goals and perception, not usually
those of intention and internal states, even in older children and adults (Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith,
2000; Congiu et al., 2010; Schlottmann et al., 2006).
Agent effects
Second, that perception of causality in reaction events did not depend on the nature of the agents at
any age tested here also ﬁts better with the undifferentiated view. We found no evidence for a position
that goal perception might be limited to typical events involving animate agents when it ﬁrst emerges
(Kamewari et al., 2005; Legerstee, 2001). Such evidence would have been incompatible with the undif-
ferentiated view, under which the nature of the agents can only matter later after learning. Indeed,
agents do affect adults’ causal impressions of reaction and launch events (Schlottmann et al., 2006),
in contrast to the ﬁndings for infants here and for older children (Schlottmann et al., 2002).
One might wonder whether we found no agent effects because their nature does not matter for
early causal perception or because both rigid and nonrigid shapes are perceived as agents. The latter
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shape also self-initiated motion. Empirically, however, self-initiated motion is not necessary to iden-
tify agents (Csibra, Gergely, Biró, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999), and it was not sufﬁcient in the control con-
ditions of numerous studies (Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey, 1998; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Movellan &
Watson, 2002; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Schlottmann et al., 2009; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004). In
fact, self-initiated rigid motion, as used here, does not trigger goal attribution in Woodward’s
(1998) paradigm, whereas our caterpillar motion does (Schlottmann & Ray, 2010). These data argue
against a view that the rigid shape here also appeared as an agent.
Still, we cannot rule out the domain-speciﬁc view completely because infant goal attribution does
not depend on agency cues in all events. Csibra and colleagues (Biró, Gergely, & Csibra, 2007; Csibra,
2008; Csibra et al., 1999) argued that the form of an action itself—without the need for agent cues—
speciﬁes goal directedness if the action is rational/efﬁcient in its environment. The approach–avoid-
ance motion of reaction events could specify goal directedness directly as well. In this view, animate
agent cues are needed for infant goal attribution when the event itself is ambiguous, as in Woodward-
style simple approach motion. Thus, lack of agent-speciﬁc reaction causality can be made to ﬁt with
the domain-speciﬁc view.
Correlation with other goal perception and action tasks
Third, 6-month-olds here perceived goal directedness in Woodward’s (1998) paradigm and acted in
a goal-directed manner in Willatts’ (1999) task, in line with previous work. However, individual dif-
ferences in goal processing did not correlate with individual differences in perceptual causality. This
is the third way in which we failed to ﬁnd positive evidence for domain speciﬁcity.
This was the most tentative aspect of our procedure, without precedent in the literature, and the
lack of correlations may simply reﬂect dissimilar tasks with different determinants of individual dif-
ferences. Infant perception and action dissociate frequently (e.g., Berthier, DeBlois, Poirier, Novak, &
Clifton, 2000; Hood, Carey, & Prabanda, 2000), and to date correlations between goal-based action
and goal perception appear in only one study; the frequency of 10-month-olds deliberately pulling
the cloth with the toy in Willatts’ (1999) task correlated with the degree of preference for new goal
trials when an actor pulled the cloths (Sommerville & Woodward, 2005; see also Woodward &
Guajardo, 2002). For younger infants, perception–action links have appeared at the group level, but
not at the individual difference level; after ‘‘reaching’’ for toys with Velcro mittens, 3-month-olds
showed the new goal effect when an actor with mittens reached for the toys (Sommerville,
Woodward, & Needham, 2005; see also Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, 2008). To reveal perception–
action links, tasks may need to be closely aligned. Our search for correlations between dissimilar
action and perception tasks may have been overambitious.
Lack of task similarity extends to details of procedure that differed between our two perception
tasks. The causal reaction perception procedure was infant controlled, with 7 or 8 habituation trials
on average; looking decreased by half for all. The goal perception task had a ﬁxed trial procedure with
6 trials; looking decreased to 70% on average. This itself may have made it difﬁcult to ﬁnd similarities
in habituation/dishabituation patterns. We used strict habituation to obtain clear evidence on per-
ceived reaction causality at 6 months of age, our main goal, because this had never been shown before.
We used a ﬁxed trial goal perception procedure to maximize chances of obtaining test trial data late in
a long session. However, parallel procedures would be preferable in the future. The use of two infant-
controlled procedures in one session is practically difﬁcult, and the use of two test sessions introduces
new sources of variability, but ﬁxed trial procedures for both tasks may be a way forward. Clearly,
with improvements, the correlational approach has further potential to test the domain speciﬁcity
of infant causal perception; for instance, one could consider correlations between individual differ-
ences in a causal perception task and a domain-speciﬁc expectation task, both using the same events
and identical habituation procedures.
In the meantime, our result that infants, as a group, perceived goal directedness in Woodward’s
(1998) goal perception task and acted in a goal-directed manner in Willatts’ (1999) tasks already
serves to rule out yet another reason for the lack of correlations found: The current sample of 6-
month-olds was clearly not simply delayed in goal-based cognition.
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the undifferentiated view in three logically independent ways. No such evidence appeared. It is worth-
while to brieﬂy consider the status of our data. None of our tasks had null results. All were highly sen-
sitive to young infants’ abilities, showing perceptual causality, goal perception, and goal-based action
by 6 months of age. However, the domain-speciﬁc view made more speciﬁc predictions, and in these
respects the data were uninformative. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, of course,
and when various task-speciﬁc factors are considered the data remain compatible with the domain-
speciﬁc view. Nevertheless, persistent failure to ﬁnd conclusive data shifts the balance of plausibility
somewhat. At a minimum, it highlights the need for more work in this area.
In the remainder of this discussion, we consider what advantage, other than parsimony, undiffer-
entiated causal perception in infancy might have and why the wider literature on causal inference
does not solve the question of domain speciﬁcity either.
Undifferentiated perceptual causality?
What makes the idea of undifferentiated perceptual causality attractive is that it applies potentially
far more widely than separate reaction and launch causalities could. Whereas launch or reaction
events are often treated as paradigm cases for real-world causality, many other causal sequences
(beginning with a ball causing a person to yell and jump out of the way) look nothing like them. Re-
cent interest in perceptual causality has been due in part to the recognition that perceptual causality
may serve as a mechanism for learning, allowing children to automatically identify and group together
causes and effects in the event stream without requiring prior knowledge or focal attention (Leslie,
1994, 1995; Schlottmann, 1999). Such a learning mechanism would be even more useful if it applied
across domains to diverse and novel causal sequences, not just reaction and launch events.
Just as the interpretation of perceptual causality may be less speciﬁc than assumed by a domain-
speciﬁc view, the stimulus conditions under which it is perceived might also be broader than usually
acknowledged. Michotte (1963) separated perceptual causality (for motion events) from a more gen-
eral perception of dependence (for changes without motion as well). But it is not clear that Michotte’s
categorical distinction between causality and dependence can be justiﬁed empirically, and in any
event the wider category of dependence may be of more general importance. We know little about
the perceptual conditions under which causality/dependence is perceived except that it is not the
same as perceptual co-occurrence; despite early reports (Yela, 1952), people do not experience a
strong causal illusion when viewing contiguous motion at a distance (Schlottmann et al., 2006) or
some contiguous qualitative changes such as in color (Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; Young & Falmier,
2008). Contrary to Michotte (1963), causality/dependence perception is not limited to the perception
of visual motion either, and causal illusions occur without it (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Huber, Schlottmann,
& Daum, 2004; Schlottmann, 1999). The paradigm cases of launch/reaction events are well known, but
boundary conditions for causality/dependence illusions remain to be established. The point here is
that broader conditions for perception of causality/dependence and a less restrictive undifferentiated
interpretation might support children’s causal learning more widely than strictly domain-speciﬁc
percepts.
Of course, even if infants do not have our domain-speciﬁc percepts, there are other possibilities for
what they may see than the undifferentiated view proposed here. There is lengthy discussion of this
issue in Schlottmann and colleagues (2009) considering, for instance, why perception of physical cau-
sality and domain-general Bayesian causal learning (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004; Sloman, 2005) are not
plausible accounts of infant perceptual causality. In the end, our undifferentiated view differs only
minimally from standard domain-speciﬁc views, assuming a single perceptual template that does
not belong to physical or social domains but applies to either instead of separate templates for launch,
reaction, and potentially other causal events, as assumed for older observers (e.g., Schlottmann, 2001;
Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). Infants’ ﬁner-grained spatiotemporal distinctions among launch, reaction,
and related events (Leslie, 1984; Schlottmann et al., 2009) might not be part of this early causal rep-
resentation. Domain-speciﬁc launch/reaction percepts by 3 years of age (Schlottmann et al., 2002)
could result from infants integrating early knowledge of the spatiotemporal structure of the physical
and social worlds with this perceptual causality template.
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view of infant cognition; it merely argues that some early causal representations are not yet
embedded with infants’ domain-speciﬁc knowledge. In fact, to return to the initial distinction between
Aristotle’s efﬁcient and ﬁnal causality, only the former is treated as undifferentiated here. Multiple
conceptualizations of causality have existed for millennia, and philosophers still have not converged
on a single concept. Multiple principles of causality, some domain speciﬁc and some not, may already
appear in infant cognition.
What does ‘‘causal understanding’’ really mean?
The domain-speciﬁc view of perceptual causality is popular because it ﬁts with other studies of in-
fants’ understanding of the social and physical worlds, often summarized as showing a causal under-
standing. However, this phrase has two meanings. It may mean that infants respond in differentiated
ways to causal structures in the environment or that infants represent such structures as causal. The
important point is that the former does not imply the latter. Differentiated responses to relationships
between observed variables unique to particular physical or social systems imply sensitivity to the
underlying domain-speciﬁc mechanisms that generated them. But infants need not represent these
relations as causal; associative knowledge can explain such data equally well.
The importance of causal perception tasks is that positive responses here indicate more than
associative knowledge, with infants appreciating that cause and effect have different roles, with one
ultimately producing the other. However, many studies taken to show infants’ domain-speciﬁc causal
perception in Saxe and Carey (2006) involve no empirical measures of perceptual causality. The
studies show domain-speciﬁc knowledge but are ambiguous with respect to causal perception. The
legitimacy of assuming causal perception, then, depends on how similar experimental events are to
standard perceptual causality displays; our studies and others (Cohen et al., 1998; Leslie & Keeble,
1987) all show that even minor changes destroy perceptual causality for infants as for adults
(Michotte, 1963). It is problematic, then, that many studies cited in Saxe and Carey (2006) did not
involve launch/reaction variations at all or involved events that occurred in part out of sight.
Extrapolation from causal perception to inference tasks in which part of the event is hidden could
be appropriate if tasks differ mainly in inferential demand. On this view, inference tasks are harder but
not qualitatively different, with even causal perception requiring an inference of the connection be-
tween cause and effect. This, however, goes against Michotte’s (1963) argument that causal perception
is in essence a form of Gestalt perception, not inference proper. Moreover, if tasks are similar and only
graded in difﬁculty, we would expect greater sensitivity overall in the easier causal perception para-
digm; it should be more sensitive not only to causal structure but also to domain-speciﬁc structure.
The data are contrary to this expectation; causal perception tasks provide evidence for causal repre-
sentation but not domain speciﬁcity, and causal inference tasks show the opposite.
To illustrate the difﬁculty with inference tasks, consider ﬁndings that infants, seeing a beanbag
ﬂying onto the stage from left/right, are surprised when an inert object appears on that side but not
when an agent appears on that side (Saxe & Carey, 2006; Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005). Here con-
ditions are far from those for perceptual causality; only cause or effect is shown, never a complete
cause–effect sequence. The data show sensitivity to the structure of action but not that infants repre-
sent this as causal, with the same result predicted if infants merely associate typical agents and actions.
Statistical knowledge of agents associated with (non)contact motion could also account for results
obtained with Ball’s (1973) paradigm (see Newman, Choi, Wynn, & Scholl, 2008), which presents what
to adults appears like a collision, with contact between the objects hidden behind a screen. Perceptual
causality is more likely in this paradigm than in the one described above because incomplete launch
events may be amodally completed in adults at least (Michotte’s, 1946/1963; Kiritani, 1999). After
habituation to incomplete events, infants are surprised to see launching with a gap but not to see a
complete collision (Kosugi & Fujita, 2002; Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995; see also Kotovsky &
Baillargeon, 2000). Infants are not surprised at either event if a human emerges from behind the
screen. If perceptual causality is assumed, then this agent effect might mean that the causal percept
is domain speciﬁc or that launch perception is simply disrupted by irregular human motion, as ap-
pears for adults (Schlottmann et al., 2006), so the data are not clear.
A. Schlottmann et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 112 (2012) 208–230 227Kotovsky and Baillargeon’s (1994, 1998) studies on infants’ understanding of size–distance rela-
tions in launch events are stronger, not requiring assumptions of amodal completion. A large or small
object launched a target to the end of the track, much farther than during habituation with an object of
intermediate size. The 6-month-olds looked longer at the less plausible small object test event than at
the large object test event. This directly shows that infants see size and distance as related in a colli-
sion. Indirectly, it shows sensitivity to conservation of momentum because size reﬂects mass. Again,
this study does not measure perceptual causality, and associative knowledge of what type of object
and motion tend to go together predicts the same responses, but during habituation infants saw re-
peated launch events, exactly as in a causal perception study. The ensuing representation can evi-
dently be interrogated just as easily regarding size–distance relations as regarding cause–effect
roles. Thus, a purely associative view would seem to be too conservative here.
The question of whether the causal percept in Kotovsky and Baillargeon’s (1994, 1998) studies is
domain speciﬁc awaits demonstration, however, that perceived reaction causality is not sensitive to
size–distance relations. Of course, the principle of momentum does not apply in the social domain,
but an expectation that agents run farther from larger predators ﬁts with intuition; related intuitions
have already appeared in older children (Wilkening, 1981) and infants (Thomsen, Frankenhuis,
Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011). Thus, Kotovsky and Baillargeon’s (1994, 1998) paradigm might not
provide a clear answer either.
Finally, Wang, Kaufman, and Baillargeon (2003) proposed teaching experiments to separate asso-
ciative/statistical knowledge of collisions from causal knowledge. If infants learn only observed statis-
tical relationships, then after suitable observations they should ﬁnd it just as easy to learn true
physical relationships rather than non-normative relationships. If incorrect relationships prove to
be difﬁcult, it would indicate prestructured knowledge. This could disentangle the different levels
at which infants might represent causal structure. Infants have difﬁculties with non-normative learn-
ing about covering events (Wang & Baillargeon, 2008), but no data have appeared on collision or ac-
tion–reaction sequences.
In sum, some argue that there is already good evidence that infants have a domain-speciﬁc causal
understanding of their world, so that ambiguity in causal perception paradigms could be resolved by
reference to this wider literature (Carey, 2009; Saxe & Carey, 2006). However, inference studies show
infant sensitivity to domain-speciﬁc structures, not that infants represent these structures as causal,
whereas causal perception studies have not found evidence for domain speciﬁcity. Existing data are
all compatible with the undifferentiated view.Conclusion
The current study shows that perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age,
in parallel with perceptual causality for launch events. In contrast, 5-month-olds are sensitive only to
spatiotemporal motion features, again in parallel with launch events. The developmental pattern is
striking, but the question of whether perception of reaction causality is domain speciﬁc from its point
of emergence remains unresolved. As argued above, this open issue looms equally over infant percep-
tion of launch causality: There are currently no data showing that this is domain speciﬁc either, so fur-
ther studies are urgently needed.
Since Premack (1990), Leslie (1994), and Mandler (1992), many assume that a basic principle by
which infants separate the social and physical worlds is whether an object interacts by contact or
at a distance. If infant perception of efﬁcient cause is initially undifferentiated, this assumption would
need to be reconsidered even within generally domain-speciﬁc views of infant cognition. We hope
that the current study helps to raise awareness of this issue.Acknowledgments
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